

# NATION-BUILDING – CONCEPTS PAPER

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## 1. Key Messages

- 1.1 *'State-building' is not the same as 'nation-building'*. Although closely related and often both required in countries with weak states and little sense of shared community, these processes are also distinct.
- 1.2 *For all practical purposes most international assistance undertaken under the auspices of 'nation-building' today is, in fact, primarily directed at 'state-building'*. Few donors or other development agencies use the term 'nation-building' in its literal sense of building a unified national society.
- 1.3 *Many of the challenges facing fragile states derive from both the absence of an effective state AND the lack of a shared sense of identity and community among the local population*. State weakness and the relative absence of nationhood are mutually reinforcing conditions.
- 1.4 *The value of 'nation-building lessons' derived from the post-Second World War reconstruction exercises in Germany and Japan is extremely limited*.
- 1.5 *The construction and reproduction of national identities is a continuous and ongoing process in all countries*.
- 1.6 *The role for external assistance in nation-building in the literal sense is necessarily a modest one*.
- 1.7 *Building functioning states is a pre-requisite, though not the only one, for effective nationhood*.
- 1.8 *Active citizenship is a vital ingredient for building a coherent national community*.
- 1.9 *Enhancing political participation is also necessary for 'nation-building'*.
- 1.10 *'Nation-building' requires a critical focus on state/society relations rather than separate focuses on state and civil society respectively*.

## 2. Nation-Building – Conceptual and Definitional Challenges

Though widely used, the term 'nation-building' remains imprecise and contested. In much of the policy documentation, its meaning is assumed rather than defined. There is also a tendency to use the term 'nation-building' interchangeably with that of 'state-building'. Despite this, many observers would maintain that, while closely related, 'state-building' and 'nation-building' are distinct processes. 'State-building' is seen as the task of building functioning states capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood. 'Nation-building', on the other hand, refers to more abstract process of developing a shared sense of identity or community among the various groups making up the population of a particular state. Distinguished in this way, 'state-building' focuses on the practical task of building or strengthening state institutions, while 'nation-building' is more concerned with the character of relations between citizens and their state. 'State-building' has long been a focus of international development assistance with a wide range of capacity-building programs directed at strengthening key institutions. 'Nation-building', on the other hand, has often been viewed as a more nebulous process with a limited role for external assistance.

These distinctions have been obscured by the very particular usage of the term 'nation-building' in current international security and foreign policy discourses, especially since the attacks against the United States in September 2001. 'Nation-building' now provides the rationale for militaristic interventions in countries that are deemed to constitute serious threats to the international security, as well as for external engagements with post-conflict countries whose states are considered to have 'failed' or be at risk of 'failure'. The focus here is not on 'nation-building' in the literal sense of building a shared sense of community. Rather, it is about regime change or democratisation, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the reconstruction of states that have collapsed or been seriously

weakened as a result of internal conflict, as in the cases of Timor-Leste or Solomon Islands. Advocates of this version of 'nation-building' claim that it can be organised from outside by the international community of states and view its principal strategic objective as the enhancement of regional and international security (Ottaway 2002). Questions concerning the democratic capacity of the structures being built and the role of the population concerned are often overlooked in favour of a rather mechanistic reconstruction of the state concerned. 'Nation-building' in this sense is more about building states than nations.

This usage – which is particularly favoured in the United States - has been criticised by some for reflecting America's own historical experience of constructing a political order in a newly settled country without deeply rooted peoples, cultures, and traditions. Reflecting a very different history, European commentators argue that nations need to evolve organically and that they are rarely constructed successfully by external powers. 'Nation-building' is, in other words, an evolutionary rather than revolutionary social process. This perspective recognises that as well as a functioning state, 'nation-building' also requires nurturing a sense of community where none previously existed, or shoring up one that was not firmly or properly constructed, or whose existence has been undermined by war or internal conflict.

These different meanings illustrate the continuing lack of consensus over what constitutes 'nation-building', let alone how best it can be achieved in practice. In recent years, the term has become progressively entangled in wider debates relating to regional and international security, regime change, democratisation, and so on. The growing prominence of foreign and security policy perspectives has also detracted from more development-oriented views of 'nation-building'. Arguably, the domain of development policy is itself being increasingly defined around contributions towards strengthening the functionality of 'weak' and 'fragile' states. The narrower focus of current conceptions of 'nation-building' is exemplified in the definition provided by the widely cited 2003 RAND study of American experience in external 'nation-building' exercises, one of the few definitions on offer. According to this study, 'nation-building' is "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy".

While few would disagree with the proposition that functioning states capable of fulfilling their basic roles are a pre-requisite for the pursuit of other development objectives, it is important that broader conceptions of development are not obscured by the current concern with strategic and security considerations. The narrowing of these discourses in the sense of a broader understanding of security makes the task of formulating a distinct position on 'nation-building' from a development policy perspective all the more necessary. Development policy aims to help shape conditions in recipient countries on the basis of a partnership basis between external and local actors using civil and structural instruments. It also presupposes that this co-shaping process is desired, necessary and possible. 'Nation-building' that goes beyond intervention purely in accordance with international law or military intervention comes under the area of responsibility of development policy. Contrary to many contemporary accounts, 'nation-building' does not commence with the end of violent conflict or, indeed, other processes of decline. It is an ongoing process in all countries aimed at establishing and reproducing an integrated national society based on shared values and goals.

Many of the same issues arising in current debates about 'nation-building' were the subject of an earlier, though, sadly, rarely acknowledged, academic literature. Indeed, 'nation-building' was a central concern of the comparative study of newly independent former colonial states in Asia and Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s (see, for example, Bendix 1969, Deutsch and Foltz 1963, Fallers 1977, Geertz 1963 and Pye 1962). The term 'nation-building' came to possess both a general and a restricted sense. In general, the term referred to the policies and projects by which newly independent governments would purposively effect the transition from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. This quest or transition entailed a total and massive effort of social engineering' in which all elements of a modern state were assembled. These elements included the administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations recognised by the social theorist Max Weber as the core of any state. The crucial element for establishing a modern state, however, was the establishment of an independent political apparatus distinct from any individual ruler and which

indeed the ruler had a duty to maintain. Thus, in its more general sense, 'nation-building' implied and encompassed 'state-building'.

In its more restricted sense, 'nation-building' referred to the self-conscious production and dissemination of national consciousness and sentiment – of a felt sense of national identity. This task was to be undertaken by a small minority of intellectuals and state officials. 'Nation building' in this sense effectively denoted the cultural and psychological dimensions of the transition to 'modernity', whereas 'state-building' denoted the social, political and economic dimensions. Accordingly, students of 'nation-building' focused their attention on cultural and educational policies in the new states. Anthropologically inclined investigations examined the particular ways in which the construction of identity was implemented and communicated through schooling, mass media, child socialisation, and the iconography and ceremonies of the nation-state.

More recent academic interest has rejected two related key presuppositions of the earlier work on 'nation-building'. First, the analytical framework of 'modernisation' has been abandoned. It is no longer assumed that the formation of national identity occurs within the constraints of an inexorable historical (eg, evolutionary) process in which 'traditional' communities must yield to 'modern' forms of social life. Secondly, current approaches to the construction of national identities dispense with the assumption that 'nation-building', in both its general and restricted senses, is exclusively the concern of newly independent colonial states or 'transitional' societies. On the contrary, recent work in the 'old' states of Europe – not to mention active separatist movements – makes it clear that the construction and maintenance of national identities is now and always has been a live, contested issues.

The current bout of international interventionism under the auspices of 'nation-building' has generated its own burgeoning literature. Major studies include Simon Chesterman's *You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*; the RAND study of the American and UN experiences with 'nation-building'; the US Institute of Peace volume *Turbulent Peace*; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies report *Winning the Peace*. As ever, the gap between the policy and scholarly literature remains a wide one. A rich scholarly literature addresses nationalism and the historical processes of the formation of nation-states in Europe (see, for example, Guibernau 1996 and Tilly 1975). Mention has already been made of the earlier literature examining the challenges of building nation-states in various colonial and, more recently, post-colonial settings. It is hard to find any references that addressing the practicalities of external assistance to the building of national identities. This is largely because 'nation-building' in this sense has not been a major focus in development assistance. Where it has arisen, it has often been implicit or otherwise subsumed within broader 'state-building' programs. The bibliography at the end of this paper provides an indicative – rather than comprehensive - list of relevant policy and academic literature.

### **3. Evolution of the Concept of Nation-Building**

Despite its newly acquired prominence in contemporary international politics, the practice of 'nation-building' has a lengthy history. A glance at how dramatically the political map of the world has changed over the centuries provides ample evidence that 'nation-building' has been around for a very long time indeed. The purpose of the following discussion of the evolution of different forms of 'nation-building' is (a) to acknowledge that the US-led military-style regime changes currently underway in Iraq and Afghanistan under the rubric of 'nation-building' are essentially distortions of what are otherwise reasonably sound, if by no means precise, concepts and (b) to remind us of the importance of understanding the history of earlier 'nation-building' exercises in order to better address today's challenges and (c) to make clear that a one-size-fits-all approach is wholly inappropriate in this context and (d) to stimulate thinking about the critical elements that compromise 'nationhood' that can serve to inform a more development-oriented approach to nation-building' as envisaged in the recent White Paper.

Looking back at the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries indicates that the principal types of 'nation-building' with the most lasting impact on the modern world have been *nationalism* and *colonialism*. Some have also proposed the *post-World War II reconstruction* of Germany and Japan as examples of successful external 'nation-building' but, as argued below, this is not a particularly convincing claim.

### 3.1 *Nationalism*

Nationalism was an important, though by no means the only, factor in the development of the first European nation-states. The formation of nations in this part of the world generally preceded the establishment of states. The theory propagated by nationalist leaders at the time was that each nation, embodying a shared community of culture and blood, was entitled to its own state. This brand of nationalism contributed to the reunification of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871, as well as to the break-up of Austria-Hungary in 1918. There were, of course, many other factors involved. Building a sense of nation took a very long time - often hundreds of years - and was almost invariably achieved through warfare and serious conflict as centralised administrations forcefully took over the role and authority of smaller political units. It was the result not only of political leadership but also of changes in technology and economic processes (the agricultural and then industrial revolutions), as well as issues of communication, culture and civil society. 'Nation-building' of this kind was most successful where governments were relatively capable, where powerful states decided to make room for new entrants, and where populations were not deeply divided. For example, Germany had a capable government and was highly successful in forging a national identity. By contrast, Yugoslavia was dramatically less successful as demonstrated by its disintegration in the post-Cold War period

### 3.2 *Colonialism and the creation of 'States without Nation'*

Processes of state-formation throughout most of what is now called the developing world followed a very different trajectory to that of the original European model. The manner in which these states were initially created has contributed greatly to the challenges they have faced since gaining independence. During the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the major European powers established dozens of new states as they conquered vast swaths of territory. Arbitrary borders created during this time typically contained a myriad of different peoples and autonomous societies, often with lengthy histories of rivalry and animosity. Colonial states were by definition non-democratic entities, and structured primarily to promote the political and economic interests of the metropolitan powers rather than the advancement of colonial subjects. Building a sense of common identity among the indigenous subjects of these territories was not part of the colonial agenda. Indeed, many colonial regimes used divide and rule tactics to maintain their domination and, in the process, accentuated divisions among their subjects. Where nationalist movements arose, these were often in the form of independence movements directed at the overthrow of colonial rule. In other words, a sense of unity was more likely to be generated by opposition to external intervention rather than because of it. In some places, including Melanesian countries like PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the absence of significant independence movements perpetuated high levels of internal diversity.

Few colonies were prepared for the challenges and responsibilities of independent statehood. The institutions of the modern state were often assembled hastily in the years preceding independence, with little familiarity or expertise to run them among the local population. Economies remained skewed towards the interests of departing colonial powers, essential infrastructure was often minimal, and in many cases there was little sense of shared identity among the 'citizens' of the new state. For most rural villagers, pre-colonial institutions associated with small-scale 'stateless' societies continued to provide the main point of reference in their daily lives. In brief, the wave of decolonisation that commenced after the Second World War created large numbers of what were, in effect, *states without nations*. Unlike the original European nation-states, the creation of state has preceded the building of nation in much of the colonial and post-colonial world. The artificial and imposed character of the state accounts for many of today's problems.

The demise of authoritarian colonial regimes was often accompanied by the emergence or re-surfacing of ethnic and regional divisions. Many new states were plagued by what outsiders called

'tribalism'. Internal divisions and conflict sometimes threatened the national integrity of newly independent countries, such as the attempt by Biafra to secede from Nigeria. The division of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh is another example where ethnic and religious differences, aided by geographic distance, tore apart a post-colonial state. While less dramatic than elsewhere, a wave of micro-nationalist and secessionist movements greeted the creation of independent states in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu respectively. In these and many other countries, political decentralisation - in the form of provincial governments or other kinds of locally-directed administration - was seen as an important instrument for promoting political participation and national unity in the face of multiple pressures for local autonomy. The nation-building dimensions of decentralisation were, for example, made explicit in the deliberations of PNG's Constitutional Planning Commission (CPC):

*Creating a nation out of the bewildering diversity of PNG would only be possible if opportunities for participation at the local level gave rise to the confidence needed to participate in the wider state; suspicions of neighbouring groups and apprehension – particularly on the part of both relatively well-developed and relatively poorly-developed areas – about independence resulting in loss of opportunities could only be overcome in this way. In addition, in the absence of widespread nationalism the CPC sought to foster national identity through an institutional 'broker' between clan and local-level organizations on the one hand and the remote central government on the other (May and Regan 1997, 11).*

Nationalist rulers and intellectuals were confronted with the task of trying to cultivate a sense of nation to legitimate their new states. This involved attempts to transform the symbolic framework through which people experienced social reality and was a cultural task as much as anything else. A common national identity containing the myths and symbols around which people could unite was needed to confer significance on the activities of the state, as well as on the civil life of its citizens. As Geertz observes "the transfer of sovereignty from a colonial regime to an independent one is more than a mere shift of power from foreign hands to native ones; it is a transformation of the whole pattern of political life, a metamorphosis of subjects into citizens" (1993). The shaping of nations throughout most of the developing world has occurred on the basis of political, rather than ethnic, communities. Creating a sense of shared community in these circumstances required the integration of different groups through the infusion of a common language and culture. It also needed the development of a common consciousness and a common political project concerning the future.

Such a project was often outlined in the broad vision of national development set out in foundational documents like independence constitutions and in the writings of nationalist intellectuals. The invocation of past memories and experiences is usually integral to these nationalist visions. Nationalism invokes a common past and selects and reinterprets certain events to increase a sense of coherence amongst diverse multi-ethnic populations. Past, present and future are fused to bestow on the community a sense of continuity upon which the new nation is founded. In the Pacific islands, this kind of visioning drawing on a traditional past to chart the national future is found in, often vague, notions like 'the Pacific Way' coined by first prime minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, and 'the Melanesian Way' advocated by the PNG intellectual, Bernard Narakobi. An obvious difficulty in developing national visions linking the pre-colonial past to the post-colonial future is that pre-colonial history is itself often acutely fragmented and ethnicised, containing many conflicts and wars between groups which now find themselves in the same state. This contributes to the difficulties in overcoming the intrinsic fragility of artificially created states founded upon a heterogeneous population. Most of today's 'failed' states are a product of the vicissitudes of colonial history. The absence of a coherent civil society capable of exercising some degree of accountability towards weak post-colonial states in poly-ethnic societies continues to be one of the greatest obstacles to the stability of emergent nation-states.

There have of course been some cases where the colonial experience helped foster national identity in the post-independence period. An example would be India's experience of an extended period of colonial rule under the British. This contributed to India's sense of itself as a single,

unified political space (despite subsequent religious partitioning). It also contributed to its acquisition of a common language, a civil service and bureaucratic tradition, an army and other institutions that were critical to the emergence of a democratic India after independence in 1947.

### 3.3 *Post-World War II Reconstruction*

The reconstruction and transformation of West Germany and Japan into democratic states by the U.S. and allied powers following World War II is often cited as the most successful 'nation-building' exercise ever undertaken by external powers. This claim is hard to sustain on a number of grounds. Although defeated and destroyed, these countries had strong nationalist sentiments (arguably too strong!), state traditions and highly competent government personnel. The high level of education and industrial know-how in both countries helped launch their economic recovery in a manner that is inconceivable almost anywhere else. West Germany and Japan were, in other words, already mature nation-states. They were both ethnic and cultural communities as well as political states. What occurred was a re-legitimation of the new governments on a democratic basis, with the drafting of democratic constitutions, and this was eventually followed by assistance in economic development.

### 3.4 *The Cold War and Beyond*

The Cold War saw intense rivalry between the world's two major ideological blocs. On the one hand, this entailed efforts to support 'friendly' states, often with little concern about the integrity, effectiveness and legitimacy of incumbent governments. On the other hand, it included equally questionable attempts to undermine or destabilise 'unfriendly' administrations. 'Nation-building', in any sense, was not a priority in the politics of the Cold War.

The most recent wave of external interventions has taken place against the growing incidence of internal conflict and state failure mainly in developing countries - but also in many of the former Eastern bloc countries - after the end of the Cold War. Numerous conflicts that had been effectively frozen during the Cold War erupted and this led to a steady deterioration of political conditions. International humanitarian missions under the auspices of the UN multiplied in the 1990s and met with mixed results. The events of 9/11 and subsequent ascendancy of the 'war on terror' has imbued recent international nation-building efforts with a distinct security character. Whereas in the past, state failure was viewed primarily in humanitarian and developmental terms, viewing them through the prism of the 'war on terror' has recast them primarily in security terms.

## 4. 'Nation-Building' from a Development Perspective

4.1 *The object of 'nation-building' from a development perspective can be said to comprise three related elements:*

(a) Firstly, the development of an effectively functioning state that is accepted – that is, accorded legitimacy - by the bulk of its citizens. Central to this are the functions of securing a monopoly of force, guaranteeing security for the population and neighbouring countries, the rule of law, and the provision of public assets. These are fundamental attributes of statehood and - although not the full story - constitute a necessary foundation for 'nation-building'.

(b) Secondly, 'nation-building' also requires a physical, social and communications infrastructure that is shared by the entire civil society. These assets must be accessible for all groups of the population and be used by them for transactions and communication. It is difficult to build a sense of nation in a country containing regions or areas whose inhabitants are effectively cut-off – physically and socially – from the rest of the 'national' population.

(c) In addition to these conventional 'state-building' components, 'nation-building' further presupposes a socio-cultural structuring and integration process leading to shared characteristics of identity, values and goals. It is not so much the homogeneity of these characteristics that is crucial, rather it is the acceptance and toleration of heterogeneity and the facilitation of inclusion.

The relevant phrase used in Papua New Guinea – one of the most socio-linguistically diverse countries in the world - is “unity in diversity”.

#### 4.2 *The subject of ‘nation-building’ is the community of citizens that together wants to form a nation and assume responsibility for this process.*

‘Nation-building’ cannot be built solely from the top-down but requires the active participation of ordinary citizens in the shaping of a common political will. It is the citizens who must provide the necessary legitimacy to the new state. Commitment to the common good and to a shared community are essential because effective collective decision-making often entails imposing on various participants sacrifices for the common good (eg. to protect the environment for future generations). If these sacrifices are not backed up by shared values and bonds, the key elements of community, they will not be treated as legitimate and hence will either have to be brought about through force, or will not be effectively achieved.

Citizenship is another critical foundation that sustains the modern nation-state. The working of key institutions such as, for example, the justice and political systems, is largely dependent on individuals accepting and understanding their status as citizens with the rights and responsibilities that this entails. Citizenship provides the basis of the social contract binding individuals to a particular nation-state and vice versa. Where individual identities and allegiances are founded primarily on membership of ethnic and other highly localised groups, these can weaken or undermine the sense of membership of a larger political community. Loyalties to ethnic group, tribe or clan, remain deeply embedded in many places and in some, such as the Melanesian countries, are often more important to rural villagers than membership of the modern nation-state. Where states have never functioned effectively or have ceased to do so, the appeal of sub-national identities is likely to persist or even be strengthened, in the process weakening efforts to build a sense of national community.

#### 4.3 *Practical ways of supporting national integration*

There is no blueprint for successful ‘nation-building’ in this broader sense and the role for external assistance is necessarily a modest and indirect one. Building a community of shared interests and identity has to be driven by local actors. ‘Nation-building’ is also an inherently complex and continuing task that does not fit easily into pre-determined analytical frameworks and timeframes set by external parties. At best, external assistance can help facilitate internal processes aimed at integrating groups and regions into a national community. The ‘do no harm’ principle of development assistance (Anderson 1999), translates into the avoidance of initiatives that fragment and divide local populations and the active pursuit of policies that promote national integration. Much of the development work currently supported by external donors in areas such as governance, law and justice, education, infrastructure development and so on can contribute to the building of national cohesion. Given that the post-colonial state has to play the critical role in developing the ideological and institutional infrastructure needed for nationhood, external support for ‘state-building’ activities is itself an indirect contributor to ‘nation-building’.

*Building Nation Through Strengthening Civic Awareness and Civil Society* (see also Section 5 below).

Civil society is the realm of citizen activities independent of the state and beyond the household. It comprises organised groups or associations formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or advance their interests, values and identities. It is now widely accepted that civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a critical role in developing the social and political capacities of the poor, increasing the effectiveness in influencing governance institutions and making the latter more responsive to needs. Supporting civil society can include measures that promote access to information, freedom of expression, developing pro-poor associations, as examining barriers against political inclusion of the poor.

#### *Building Nation Through Enhancing Political Participation*

Enhancing political participation is a pre-requisite for building a coherent national community. Political participation can be enhanced structurally by decentralisation aimed at enhancing access to the state and making it more responsive to local needs. This is particularly the case in socially

and geographically fragmented countries where state resources remain concentrated in particular areas and remote from the bulk of the population. One idea that has been adopted in some deeply divided societies such as Somalia has been the concept of “building-blocks”, using a decentralised approach to ‘nation-building’, rather than continuing with discredited efforts that concentrate on trying to produce a unified administration in one go. Similar thinking lies behind continuing efforts at decentralisation in the Pacific islands.

Enabling ordinary citizens to participate in and influence decision-making processes, especially at local levels, is a key aspect of good governance and effective nation-building. During the 1990s, discourse on participation originally focused on community or social participation as ‘beneficiaries; in development project. In 1995, the World Bank Learning Group on Participation defined participation as a “process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1995). This requires an emphasis on engaging people as citizens in activities that traditionally formed part of the state sphere. Among other things, increased political participation will improve the efficiency of public services, will make government more accountable, and will deepen democracy – complementing representative forms with more participatory forms of democracy.

## **5. Building National Communities through Active Citizenship – Some Implications for Aid Practice**

Building national communities requires effective states that, in turn, require empowered citizens. Donor policy should strengthen the role of active citizens. More active engagement by citizens with the state can help make it more accountable, especially to disadvantaged groups. Donors can help build state-citizen relationships in diverse country contexts by giving careful thought to the aid instruments they use, what they fund, and how they deploy staff.

Categories of Citizen Action:

*a. Citizenship awareness* – leads to better informed people who can understand their rights and are able to constructively and effectively claim them through collective action and political processes;

*b. Citizenship participation in Civil Society Organisations* – can contribute to critically (self)reflective democratic and accountable CSOs that are responsive to the rights, values, aspirations, interests and priorities of the constituencies.

*c. Citizen participation in local development and service delivery* – results not only in better services but can also serve as a learning ground for new forms of cooperation between state officials, politicians and citizens. Research shows that this approach is as important in fragile post-conflict states as in more stable environments.

Options for Policy and Practice:

- State-building and pro-poor change can occur through social movements that are contesting established values and structural power relations. On this basis, CSOs that challenge the status quo could warrant support. But support must be designed so that donors’ procedural and reporting requirements do not undermine the capacity of citizen’s groups to work together on their own agendas.
- At the same time, it is important that donors’ interventions do not undermine citizens’ own efforts at problem solving and put at risk the very autonomy that donors value about civil society. For example, small grants can often be more effective than larger sums that can lead to donors’ agendas becoming too dominant.
- Consideration should be given to funding public space for debate (eg. dialogue forums), while providing support to those in civil society who help the most marginalised gain the confidence to make their voices heard. Inviting marginalised groups is necessary but not sufficient in situations of unequal power relations (eg. gender relations).
- Donors need to be aware that a parallel funding approach runs the risk of placing state and civil society as polar opposites, missing opportunities to support networks and organizations that straddle the state/society divide.



- Donors can support groups working across state/society boundaries by brokering connections. Ultimately this is more effective than programs that focus solely on either governance (state) reform or civil society (society) building. DFID in Peru has used its strategic impact fund very effectively to support policy networks in this way (DFID 2005).
- More long-term grant support to autonomous research institutions can strengthen the capacity for evidence-based policy making that is genuinely driven by local, rather than donor, generated agendas.

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# Welchen Beitrag kann die katholische Kirche zum *nation-building* in Papua-Neuguinea leisten?

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St. Augustin

**1. Papua-Neuguinea feierte am 16.9.1975 den Tag seiner Unabhängigkeit** von Australien, das dieses Land seit dem 1. Weltkrieg verwaltete.

Ohne Zweifel spielen die Kirchen eine wichtige Rolle im Prozess der Entwicklung des Landes. Etwa knappe hundert Jahre haben christliche Missionen in Papua-Neuguinea (PNG) gewirkt. Ich darf mich hier auf die katholische Kirche beschränken, ohne zu vergessen, dass auch andere Kirchen mitbeteiligt sind. Prominente Kirchenmitglieder wie John Momis, Bernard Narakobi, Bp Cherubim Dambui nahmen und nehmen politische Rollen ein. Der Staat arbeitet zusammen mit den Kirchen in der Erziehung, dem Gesundheitswesen und den Medien (Church and Education Council, Medical Council, Media Council).

Als Beispiel des Mitwirkens zur staatlichen Unabhängigkeit möchte ich hier erwähnen: Die Nationalhymne „Arise all you sons of this land“ wurde von einer katholischen Nonne komponiert und auch der Entwurf der Nationalflagge stammt von einer katholischen Schülerin aus Yule Island.

## 2. Kulturelle Situation

2.1 Sehr leicht findet man höhere Zahlen, wenn man die Sprachgruppen zählt, mehr als 700 oder auch 856. Es gehört zu den Melanesiern, in Gruppen und Kleingruppen gegliedert zu sein. Diese Gruppen prägen ihr Denken und Handeln. Das innere Band der Gruppe ist die Verwandtschaftsbeziehung aber auch das äußere Zusammenwohnen. Diese beiden Kreise können sich überschneiden. Die Elemente der Zusammengehörigkeit sind gegenseitige Verlässlichkeit, Hilfe in allen Lebenssituationen und Vertrauenswürdigkeit.

Daraus ergibt sich eine Einheit der Gruppe, die sich wie folgt auswirkt:

- \* Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Hausbau, Kanubau, Abwehr von Unglücken, Gartenbau)
- \* Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (indirekt durch Magie, Rache; der Schuldige findet in der Gruppe immer Zuflucht)
- \* politische Gemeinschaft (Handelspartner, Brautpreise, Bündnisse...)
- \* Lebensgemeinschaft (Gemeinsames Tragen von Freud und Leid)

Diese Bande erhalten sich auch über Entfernungen hinweg (Wantok System).

Jede Gruppe hat einen Führer, der sich durch Redegabe, Geschäftstüchtigkeit, Einfluss und Prestigedenken auszeichnet. Die Führer können je nach Einflussmöglichkeit wechseln. Niemand ist auf immer Führer.

Das Erlebnis von Gemeinschaft geschieht weiterhin auf den traditionellen Bahnen der Gruppen. Die Kirche als Gemeinschaft wird oft mehr als Dienstleistungsbetrieb angesehen.

2.2 Wichtig erscheint mir auch dieser Blick auf Schwerpunkte melanesischer Kultur (nach H. Janssen):

- \* das Denken in Kommunen in Abhängigkeit von Führern
- \* das Streben nach materiellem Wohlstand
- \* das Wissen um die Arbeit als Mittel zum Wohlstand
- \* der Glaube an Abhängigkeit von außerirdischen Mächten und die Verpflichtung zur rituellen Handlung

Bei Kirche dürfen wir zwei Pole nicht vernachlässigen:

1. Kirche hat etwas mit natürlicher Gemeinschaft der Menschen zu tun. Sie darf den natürlichen Gemeinschaften nicht fremd sein.
2. Sie soll aber doch die natürlichen Gemeinschaften christlich verwandeln und das enge Gruppendenken aufbrechen.

2.3 John Momis, der lange Jahre im Parlament als Priester mitarbeitete, sieht das Mittun der Kirche unter diesem theologischen Ansatz: In der Schöpfung zeigt sich die Trinität Gottes. Mit der Erschaffung des Menschen wird der Mensch in diese Gemeinschaft hineingerufen. Der Mensch ist auf Gemeinschaft bezogen. Und hier gibt es für die katholische Theologie die Inkarnation Gottes, die für die politische Seite des Menschen bestimmend wird. Die Trennung von Kirche und Staat hat sich auf Grund von Fehlhaltungen über die Jahrhunderte im Westen entwickelt. Doch sind wir immer noch der eine Mensch, ob wir in die Kirche gehen, oder in politischen Gremien mitwirken. Zu viele Menschen missverstehen die Rolle der Christen und sehen sie zunächst und vor allem in einer persönlichen Gottesbeziehung. Wichtig ist die persönliche Gottesbeziehung, aus der heraus man sich dem Nächsten zuwendet und es wird sich um gute zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen zu Freunden und zu einigen anderen in der Gesellschaft bemüht. Doch das genügt nicht. Gott will aber seine Güte mit allen teilen.

Da Parlamentarier mit der Vergabe von Finanzen betraut sind, möchten viele, die sich für die Leute einsetzen wollen, in diese Position gelangen. So möchten sich auch viele einheimische katholische Priester als Parlamentsabgeordnete wählen lassen.

2.4 John Momis war an der textlichen Formulierung der Verfassung mit beteiligt. Später stützte er sich auch auf das Subsidiaritätssystem, das vom Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil propagiert wurde, als es um die Einsetzung der staatlichen Provinzstruktur in Papua-Neuguinea ging.

### **3. Einige Punkte zum Beitrag der Kirche**

3.1 In der Präambel der neuen Verfassung heißt es:

„Wir das Volk von Papua-Neuguinea ... verpflichten uns, die ehrwürdigen Traditionen und die christlichen Prinzipien, zu denen wir uns nun bekennen, zu beschützen und an unsere Nachkommen weiterzugeben.“

„Wir, das Volk, errichten nun diese unabhängige Nation und erklären uns selbst, unter der führenden Hand Gottes, als der unabhängige Staat Papua-Neuguinea.“

3.2 Tok Pisin (Pidgin Englisch)

Papua-Neuguinea hat drei offizielle Staatssprachen: Englisch, Tok Pisin und Motu. Neben den 856 Sprachen des Landes kann sich über die Hälfte der Bevölkerung mit Tok Pisin verständigen. Die Anfänge dieser Sprache liegen zu Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die für drei Jahre angestellten Plantagenarbeiter fingen an, sich mit „tok boi“ zu verständigen. Die deutsche Kolonialregierung hat diese Umgangssprache wenig unterstützt. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde sie auch von der australischen Kolonialregierung nicht gefördert. Dagegen steht der Gebrauch bei den Kirchen: 1931 entschloss sich die katholische Kirche an der Nordküste in Madang (Alexishafen), Tok Pisin als Medium der Verständigung zu übernehmen. Die Lutheraner taten dies erst 1956. So kam es 1969 zur ersten Tok Pisin-Ausgabe des Neuen Testaments und 1989 zur Veröffentlichung des Alten Testaments in Tok Pisin.

Seit 1957 standardisierte das von P. Frank Mihalic SVD herausgegebene Wörterbuch und die Grammatik die verschiedenen Formen von Tok Pisin (Dictionary and Grammar of Neo-Melanesian).

Die Wochenzeitung „Wantok“ wurde von Frank Mihalic gegründet (1968) und ist heute die einzige überregionale Tok Pisin-Zeitung in PNG. Sicher beklagt so mancher den „Waigani Dialekt“, das heißt, dass viele Worte ohne Englischkenntnisse nicht verstanden werden. Die Zeitung braucht auch immer wieder finanzielle Unterstützung von außen, denn diese Zeitung wird gern gelesen, doch nicht gern gekauft.

### 3.3 Bildung

Die Erziehungsarbeit durch Schulen gehörte von Anfang an mit zur Missionsarbeit der Kirchen. Damit wurde die staatliche Unabhängigkeit vorbereitet und wird auch weiter unterstützt. Sir Michael Somare, der jetzige Prime Minister, nannte die Hilfe der Kirche bei seiner Rede zum Abschluss der General Assembly der katholischen Kirche im Juli 2004: die technischen Schulen der Salesianer Don Bosco in Port Moresby und an anderen Plätzen in PNG, die Divine Word University in Madang und St. Benedict Teacher's College in Kaindi, Wewak. Auch andere Lehrinstitutionen wie beispielsweise das Public Service Training Centre in Madang wurden an die Divine Word Universität angegliedert.

### 3.4 Gesundheitswesen

Der Auftrag, die Liebe Gottes mit allen zu teilen, bezieht sich vor allem auf die Sorge um die Kranken. Daher wird Krankenpflege voll von der Kirche unterstützt. Krankenschwesternausbildung, Krankenhäuser und Erste Hilfe Stationen werden gerade dort aufrechterhalten, wo staatliche Hilfe fehlt. Oft werden diese Institutionen von staatlichen Beamten als Dienstanbieter angesehen, die selbst für ihre Finanzen sorgen dürfen.

### 3.5 Kulturen

Dort wo katholische Missionare hinkamen wurde auch die einheimische Kultur studiert. Es lag nicht im Interesse der katholischen Mission, Kultur zu zerstören (siehe Präambel: „die ehrwürdigen Traditionen“). Es entstanden Ethnologische Studien, Sammlungen von traditioneller Kunst, Sprachstudien, Wörterbücher, schriftliches Festhalten von mündlichen Traditionen und mehr. Das Melanesische Institut in Goroka wurde als Instrument der Erforschung der Kultur eingerichtet. In dem Gebiet, wo ich tätig war, gab es auch Beispiele von Dokumentationen der Kultur durch Lutheraner (Bergmann, W.: The Kamanuku: The Culture of the Chimbu Tribes, a Monograph in Four Volumes, 1971).

## 4. Situation (challenges) Herausforderungen, zu bewältigende Aufgaben

### 4.1 Hand-out Mentalität (Bettler Mentalität)

Die oben erwähnte Abhängigkeit von Führern macht sich gerade auf diesem Gebiet sehr bemerkbar. Man erwartet, dass man von anderen am Leben erhalten wird. Wer z.B. ins Parlament geht hat die Aufgabe, für seine Wähler alle möglichen Dienste zu erwerben. Es wird v.a. mit Bargeld gerechnet, das für geleistete (und auch nicht geleistete) Aufgaben erwartet wird. „Gimme guys“ (give me) - im Simbu in Kuman „naro“ oder „nato“ (gib mir) - ist sehr oft zu hören. So wurde auch der Mission vorgeworfen, dass sie zu leicht materiell hilft. Immer wieder, wenn etwas passiert (Trockenzeit, Erdbeben, Hausbrand, Krankheit, Unfall...), wird vom Staat oder von der Kirche Hilfe in Cash erwartet. Versicherungen sind sehr zurückhaltend bei den eingehenden Anfragen zur Kompensation. Verletzungen werden zu Bargeld umgerechnet.

### 4.2 Bighead, mangelnde Selbstdisziplin

Geregelter Schulablauf und Bürozeiten sowie Vereinbartes voll durchzuführen, lässt sich in PNG nicht immer finden. So werden staatliche Dienste durch nicht präsent sein nicht weiterbearbeitet. Es kommt öfters vor, dass erst dann etwas bestellt wird, wenn es ausgegangen ist. Dann dauert es manchmal Wochen bis es wieder Nachschub für Führerscheine oder Nummernschilder für Autozulassungen gibt. Auch die Versorgung mit Medikamenten leidet darunter.

### 4.3 Sanguma, Rache, Stammeskämpfe

Krankheit und Unfälle geschehen nicht ohne Grund. So muss jemand dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden. Sanguma ist nicht das gleiche in allen Teilen von PNG. An der Küste geht es mehr um Vergiftung, im Hochland ist es mehr Hexenglaube. Die Angst vor Sanguma verurteilt viele Leute zur Passivität. Sehr leicht werden bei tödlichen Unglücksfällen einzelne Frauen oder Männer dafür verantwortlich gemacht und als Sanguma getötet. Übersehen wird zu leicht, dass man nicht den bösen Geist tötet, sondern seinen Bruder oder seine Schwester. Auf Grund der sofort

ausgeführten Rache gibt es keine Fahrerflucht in PNG. Man meldet den Unfall in einer weiter entfernten Polizeistation an.

Früher ging es bei den Stammeskämpfen um Land, Frauen oder Schweine. Heute werden politische Differenzen sehr oft durch Stammeskämpfe weiter ausgetragen. Die Zeit nach den Wahlen ist im Hochland zu einer Zeit der Stammeskämpfe geworden, die aber nun nicht mehr mit Pfeil und Bogen, sondern mit modernen Waffen ausgetragen werden. Da die Gruppen und Stammeszugehörigkeiten bedeutend kleiner sind als in Afrika, gibt es genug Ausweichgebiete, so dass man nicht in einer totalen Kriegszone lebt. Bougainville war da totaler und an den Folgen trägt PNG heute noch.

#### 4.4 Familienprobleme, Gewalt gegen Frauen, Kindesmissbrauch

Mit der Mobilität wurde die Unterstützung der Familie für die Heirat schwächer. Vor allem viele Ehen von Lehrern und Public Servants sind in einer Krise. Gewalt den Frauen gegenüber ist keine Seltenheit und auch Kinder vermissen den nötigen Schutz. Missbrauch von Alkohol führt oft zu Gewalt dem ehelichen Partner gegenüber.

#### 4.5 Law and Order

In einer Gesellschaft, wo ‚mein‘ und ‚dein‘ nicht nach westlichem Modell interpretiert werden, ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Stehlen zu einer Erwerbsquelle geworden ist. Man träumt von einem Arbeitsplatz, der gut bezahlt wird. Doch diese sind Mangelware. Sich jedoch als Subsistenzfarmer zu betätigen scheuen viele. So wird der Hunger durch Stehlen gestillt. Leider bleibt es nicht beim Mundraub in Nachbars Garten und so werden die Überfälle immer drastischer. Geschäfte, Banken, Reisende werden immer wieder zur Kasse gebeten. Der Einsatz der Polizei wirkt nur stellenweise. Was kann ein Einsatzwagen tun, wenn tausend Leute den verunglückten LKW ausrauben?! In der Stadt bewegt man sich mit offenen Augen in den Gegenden, die man kennt. Auf dem Land werden oft Früchte der Gärten geraubt, kurz bevor geerntet werden kann. Alkohol und Marihuana lassen die Drogenabhängigen vergessen, dass zum Ernten auch das Pflanzen gehört.

#### 4.6 HIV/AIDS

PNG ist keine Insel ohne Verbindungen mit der restlichen Welt. Neben guten Einflüssen ist auch der HI-Virus ins Land gekommen. Durch das Verhalten der Menschen nehmen die Infizierungen weiter zu und in den nächsten Jahren werden mehr und mehr Folgen zu sehen sein. Was früher mit Leprakranken geschah - sie aus der Kommunität auszuschließen - geschieht heute mit HIV-Infizierten. Es werden verschiedenste rituelle Handlungen begangen, um einer Infizierung zu entgehen. Dabei wäre es wichtig, einen Lebensstil zu finden, der allen Beteiligten hilft.

### 5. Nationaler Pastoral Plan der katholischen Kirche 2006

Dieser nationale pastorale Plan der katholischen Kirche möchte allen Katholiken helfen, christliche Werte in die Gesellschaft einzubringen.

Nachdem in der katholischen Kirche von 1973 bis 1975 eine Self Study durchgeführt wurde, mit dem Ergebnis von „Wir sind die Kirche“ (Yumi yet i Sios), gab es 2003/2004 wieder ein Erneuerungs-Programm der General Assembly mit dem Thema „Alive in Christ“. Dieser Plan der Bischofskonferenz von PNG & den Salomonen gehört zu den Ergebnissen. Aus diesem Plan darf ich die folgenden Punkte nennen:

#### 5.1 Familie

Wir wünschen, dass all unsere Familien wahrhaft in Christus lebendig sind. Als Katholiken erwarten wir eine glückliche Partnerschaft in der Ehe ohne Geschlechtsverkehr vor der Heirat, Treue in der Ehe und volle Teilnahme am sakramentalen Leben der Kirche, beginnend mit der kirchlichen Heirat. Eine glückliche Ehe bedeutet eine Ehe ohne Gewaltanwendung, offen für das Geschenk von Kindern und gute Kommunikation der Ehepartner.

## 5.2 Kinder

Wir wünschen, dass all unsere Kinder, geschult oder nicht geschult, Liebe und Sorge erfahren. Alle sollen eine Erziehung erhalten, die sie zu einem erfüllten Leben führt. Das heißt: In Zusammenarbeit mit der Regierung bieten wir ihnen eine ganzheitliche Erziehung in ihrer physischen, intellektuellen und geistigen Dimension. Eltern sind die ersten Erzieher, gefolgt von formalen und nicht-formalen Lehrkräften, die eine hervorragende Ausbildung bieten, auch im Glauben.

## 5.3 Jugend

Wir wünschen, dass sich unsere Jugend an einem frohen und erfüllten Leben in Christus erfreut. Wir glauben, dass wir dies durch die Ermöglichung der aktiven Teilnahme am kirchlichen Leben und in der Gesellschaft erreichen können. Durch das Jugend Pastoral wird ein lebenslanges Engagement durch ganzheitliche Programme (sozial, geistig, emotional, Fachkenntnisse) vorbereitet. Es geht vor allem darum, Aktivitäten im Dienst für andere kennen zu lernen.

## 5.4 Erwachsene

Wir wünschen, dass unsere Erwachsenen Männer und Frauen, vor allem die Laien, ausreichend informiert sind und teilnehmen sowie Führerschaft in Kirche und Gesellschaft annehmen. Das bedeutet, sie haben Gelegenheit, sich an Kursen zur Weiterbildung (inklusive geistige Formation) zu beteiligen. Sehr wichtig wird sein, dass sie das Wesen und den Stil von echter christlicher Führung lernen. Effektive Teilnahme in der Gesellschaft verlangt nach Organen, die für Research und Planung die nötigen Informationen bieten, um so eine katholische Antwort zu den sozialen Problemen von heute und für die Zukunft zu finden.

## 5.5 Randgruppen

Wir wünschen, dass die katholische Kirche ein Modell für Gerechtigkeit ist und sie sich für Gerechtigkeit in der Gesellschaft einsetzt. Dies verlangt, dass Leute zu größerer Selbständigkeit ermutigt werden, dass es gerechte Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten gibt für die Angestellten und, dass für die Rechte aller eingetreten wird besonders für Frauen und Kinder. Wir müssen die Leute mit den notwendigen Fähigkeiten ausstatten und lernen, friedlich Konflikte zu lösen. Die Kirche sollte ein Beispiel sein im Zeugnis für die Integrität der Schöpfung und ein Advokat für die Sorge um unseren Lebensraum.

## 5.6 Kranke (AIDS)

Wir wünschen eine Wiederbelebung des kirchlichen Dienstes an den Kranken, besonders durch unsere Dienste im Gesundheitswesen und an HIV/AIDS-Kranken. Das bedeutet, dass wir uns ganz besonders um die gering bemittelten Glieder der Gesellschaft kümmern, um Frauen und Kinder und um Menschen, die mit einer HIV-Infektion und AIDS leben. Unsere Krankendienste tun dies mit höchster Qualität, damit beide - unsere Kranken und ihre Betreuer (Krankenschwestern und Krankenpfleger) - anständig betreut werden. Wir wünschen auch, unsere Abhängigkeit von überseeischer medizinischer Versorgung zu reduzieren.

6. So sieht der jetzige Beitrag der Kirche aus. Die Verwirklichung liegt beim Mittun vor allem der Gläubigen.

Von außen kann man vieles sagen und vorschlagen, doch letztlich müssen sich die Menschen von PNG für die von ihnen angenommenen Werte einsetzen. Antikorruptionskampagnen wirken nur, wenn ich nicht einfach den anderen Korruption vorwerfe, sondern auch selbst nicht danach handle.

Die Kirche wirkt bei der Nationenwerdung in Papua-Neuguinea mit und sie darf sich dabei voll auf die Verfassung stützen, auf „die ehrwürdigen Traditionen und die christlichen Prinzipien“. Das Gute sehen in den Traditionen und es auch als solches pflegen ist angesagt. Dazu die christlichen Werte weitergeben, die durch Jesus Christus vorgelebt wurden (Vergebung, Kreuz tragen, Liebe).



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